### Reverse Engineering Malware Dynamic Analysis of Binary Malware II



## Advanced dynamic analysis

- Debugger scripting
- Hooking and library injection
- Instrumentation frameworks
- Emulators and virtualization
- Memory forensics



## Debugger automation with scripting

- Debuggers can be extended with flexible scripting languages like python
- Any debugging task can be automated: unpacking, decrypting strings, etc.
- Debuggers that support python scripting:
  - Immunity debugger
  - GDB
  - IDA debugger
- Python debugger module for Windows:
  - PaiMei, reverse engineering framework includes "PyDbg" module
  - F-secure proprietary python Win32 debugger using ctypes



### Example debugger script: Sober. Y URL's

- Sober was a family of email-worms, written in Visual Basic
- It updated itself using a set of dynamically generated URL's
- Reversing the URL generation algorithm was very challenging
- Developing an automated debugging script was much faster

**DEMO**: Case Sober.Y



### Hooking and Library Injection

- Basic tracing and troubleshooting techniques
- Can be used in dynamic analysis and reverse engineering very effectively
- Hooks are not using debug API:
  - Fast execution
  - Not confused by anti-debugging tricks
- Intrusive (will modify the target address space)
- Tools can be quite complicated to use (notable exception: Frida)
- Executed on real hardware!
- Example use: Trace file I/O, registry and networking for analyzing program functionality
- Example use: Detect dynamically generated code sections for unpacking




#### Inline hooking

- Simple way to instrument binaries dynamically, without need to recompile programs
- Usually done by inserting branches to the hooked (target) functions
- Hooking function gets the same parameters as target function
- After the analysis, target function gets back the control
- Analysis code in the hooking function needs memory space
- Position-independent shellcode can be inserted anywhere in the memory space, but more common method is to provide code by injecting dynamically loaded library



#### Library injection

- Target process is forced to load extra module containing the instrumentation code
- Interesting functions in the target process are hooked
- Hooking module does the necessary processing and returns back to hooked function





#### PE IAT hooking

- Basic idea: hook by replacing the pointer in import address table (IAT) to the hooking function
- IAT can be easily parsed from the PE headers
- Hooking function is inserted in the address space by library injection



### Example hooking library: Detours

- Microsoft Research hooking/injection library for x86/amd64/ia64
   Windows
- Uses flexible inline hooking technique
- Understands native functions and managed code (MSIL)
- Detours DLL is loaded with library injection:
  - Dynamically with library injection
  - Statically, by modifying the target import table for loading the Detours DLL before target entry point executes (DetourCreateProcessWithDLL())
- Hooks are inserted conveniently with **DetourAttach()** and removed with **DetourDetach()**



### Example hooking library: Frida


- Hook library functions on Windows, OSX, iOS, Linux and Android
- Injected code written in JavaScript
- Internally, Frida injects V8 engine and builds transparent code transitions from native to JS and back





#### Example tool: FIST

- FIST: F-secure Interactive System Trace
- Proprietary tool for generic unpacking on x86 Windows
- Hooks most kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, msvcrt.dll, shell32.dll and user32.dll functions
- Hook functions compare the code in return address to the disk image
- If the return address was modified, the code is possibly near the original entry point
- Based on the fact that most non-trivial programs need to use Win32 API's





### Instrumentation frameworks

- Dynamic manipulation of programs using binary instrumentation
- Good for profiling and debugging, but also writing reverse engineering tools
- More flexible than function hooking:
  - Instrument instructions, basic blocks
  - Instrument system calls
  - Inspect memory read/write
  - ... And much more
- Major frameworks: DynamoRIO, Pin, Valgrind
- Problems with some packed files!



# Using emulators for tracing and instrumentation

- Emulators can be used for tracing by instrumenting code outside the OS
- By definition, it is non-intrusive
- Target executed on emulated hardware, more safe than debugging and hooking
- Instrumentation API:
  - Interface for hooking up instructions, exceptions etc.
  - Example: bochs instrumentation API
- Debugging API:
  - Emulator can export standard debugger API, such as GDB
  - Example: qemu GDB stub



#### **Emulator types**

- Hardware virtualization
  - Emulator is sharing the hardware resources with the host machine
  - CPU instructions run directly on real CPU
  - Good performance
  - Examples: VMWare, VirtualBox, Xen, KVM (Linux kernel VM)
- Software
  - Emulator implemented purely using software
  - CPU instructions are interpreted or translated dynamically
  - Can be quite slow
  - Examples: Bochs, Qemu

The HW/SW distinction is not really that clear, for example all HW virtualization solutions will fallback to software emulation in certain situations, like real-mode. Also Xen and KVM use qemu for hardware emulation.



## Emulator example: Bochs instrumentation API

- Bochs: open-source PC (x86/amd64) emulator
- Uses interpretation for emulating the instructions
- Interpretation makes Bochs very portable, it runs on any C++ environment
- Supports powerful instrumentation with C++
- Callbacks for
  - CPU events, like interrupts and exceptions
  - CPU instructions
- Support functions, such as memory I/O



# Emulator example: Using the Qemu GDB stub

- Qemu: open-source multi-platform emulator
- Uses dynamic code translation for speeding up the emulation
- Supports debugging via the built-in GDB stub
- Qemu GDB stub features:
  - Non-intrusive
  - Breakpoints are implemented in the stub ("hardware")
  - VM time stops when the stub is waiting for input
- GDB supports python scripting
- Flexible system-level tracing tools



#### Attacking emulators

- Malware has a lot of ways to detect emulators, roughly categorized as:
  - Timing attacks
  - OS implementation
  - Hardware implementation
  - Emulator-related software inside the OS, for example VMWare tools
- Emulators can also be attacked with denial of service attack:
  - Execute massive amount of instructions
  - Emulators in AV engines cannot give too much clock cycles for the emulator
- Most dangerous attack on emulators is to escape from the emulated environment by using a bug in the emulator sofware



### Detecting emulators: OS implementation

- If the emulator is not running full-blown OS, its API emulation can be easily detected
- Windows has huge amount of documented API's and undocumented, still quite solid API's
- Emulators try to return something even for unsupported API's, just to keep execution ongoing
- Current malware uses a lot of API-related tricks to detect emulators
- Some examples:
  - Call API's with bogus or unsupported parameters, verify return values
  - Use of callback functions in the API's for doing something useful
  - Observe side-effects of API's (register values, traces in stack etc.)



### Detecting emulators: Hardware

- Implementing a CPU emulator is a very complicated task:
  - Intel x86/amd64 instruction set consists of ~500 instructions
  - Paging and exception handling is complicated
- Full-blown PC emulator needs to implement a fair amount of hardware devices to be convincing
- Some examples for detecting emulator hardware:
  - Detect missing CPUID information or inconsistencies (\*)
  - Check implementation of complicated instructions, like CMPXCHG8B (\*)
  - Check non-zero Local Descriptor Table (LDT) to detect VMWare (\*)
  - Detect VMWare devices, for example "VMWare PCI Express Root Port"

<sup>(\*)</sup> Peter Ferrie: Attacks on More Virtual Machine Emulators (http://pferrie.tripod.com/papers/attacks2.pdf)



## Emulator detection example: CPUID instruction

- CPUID is used to get the processor information:
  - Vendor identification string, for example "GenuineIntel"
  - CPU type, family, model and stepping
  - Supported instruction sets
  - Other features, such as thermal and power management
- Software emulator needs to be consistent in CPUID return values and features it can emulate
- Attacker can also check if such a CPU is really available in reality
- Almost all software emulators fail to be consistent



#### **CPUID** continued

#### From Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:

| Initial EAX<br>Value |                          | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--|
|                      | Basic Ci                 | PUID Information   |
| OH                   | EAX<br>EBX<br>ECX<br>EDX | Maximum Input Value for Basic CPUID Information (see Table 3-18)<br>"Genu"<br>"ntel"<br>"inel"   |
| 01H                  | EAX                      | Version Information: Type, Family, Model, and Stepping ID (see Figure 3-5)   |
|                      | EBX                      | Bits 07-00: Brand Index Bits 15-08: CLFLUSH line size (Value * 8 = cache line size in bytes) Bits 23-16: Maximum number of addressable IDs for logical processors in this physical package*. Bits 31-24: Initial APIC ID |
|                      | ECX<br>EDX               | Feature Information (see Figure 3-6 and Table 3-20) Feature Information (see Figure 3-7 and Table 3-21)  |

| of addressable los for logical proce  | level caches for immedit sharing this cache.  1 is kellbrid 100 from and surviving this cache.  1 is kellbrid 100 from this guarantees of sant spon lover level of of on-origination of means aring this cache.  88 to 1 cache is not inclusive of lower cache levels.  1 is Cache in location of lower cache levels.  88 to 2 complex Cache Indexing.  9 to 100 from the location.  9 to 100 from the location.  |
|---|---|
| ure 3-6 and Table 3-20)<br>ure 3-7 and Table 3-21)  | 1 = A complex function is used to index the cache, potentially all address bits. Bits 31-03 Reserved = 0 NOTES:  * Add one to the return value to set the result.   |
| See also "PAPIT EAX = 4. Returns Deterministic Cache Parameters for each level on page 3-224.  AX Bits 04-000 Cache "type field 0 for Min 1-1-0 more caches 1 = 10 stat Cache 1 = 10 stat Cache 2 = Inspection Cache 2 = Inspection Cache 1 = 10 stat | And one to the releast value to give the result. The subsets (powed 2-1 reager that is not make the not 1-1 reager) and the notice of the releast of the notice |
| 4-31 = Reserved   | MONITOR/MWAIT Leaf  |

| Value |        | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|-------|--------|--|
| OSH   | EAX    | Bits 15-00: Smallest monitor-line size in bytes (default is processor's monitor granularity) Bits 31-16: Reserved = 0  |
|       | EBX    | Bits 15-00: Largest monitor-line size in bytes (default is processor's monitor granularity) Bits 31-16: Reserved = 0   |
|       | ECX    | Bit 00: Enumeration of Monitor-Mwait extensions (beyond EAX and<br>EBX registers) supported  |
|       |        | Bit 01: Supports treating interrupts as break-event for MWAIT, even<br>when interrupts disabled  |
|       |        | Bits 31 - 02: Reserved   |
|       | EDX    | Bits 03 - 00: Number of C0" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 07 - 06: Number of C1" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 11 - 08: Number of C2" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 15 - 12: Number of C3" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 19 - 16: Number of C4" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 19 - 16: Number of C4" sub: C-states supported using MMAIT<br>Bits 31 - 20: Reserved = 0   |
|       |        | NOTE:  * The definition of CO through C4 states for MWAIT extension are processor-specific C-states, not ACPI C-states.  |
|       | Therma | I and Power Management Leaf  |
| 06H   | EAX    | BRIOD Digital temperature sensor is supported if set<br>100 (Linear Turn) and the Control of the Control of<br>142 (MCC) (Linear (138)) and the Control of the Control of<br>142 (MCC) (Linear (138)) and the Control of the Control of<br>142 (MCC) (Linear (138)) and the Control of the Control of<br>142 (MCC) (Linear (138)) and the Control of the Control of<br>142 (MCC) (Linear (138)) and the Control of the Control of<br>143 (MCC) (MC |

| Initial EAX<br>Value |                      | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|----------------------|----------------------|--|
|                      | ECX                  | BEOD. Hardware Coordination Freedback Capability (Presence of<br>NRZ, MPERF and NRZ, MPERF). The consisting to provide a measure of<br>serviced processor performance (since six measure of the counters, sec-<br>lection CPUD Bread Street, Section |
|                      | EDX                  | Reserved = 0   |
|                      | Structur<br>Input ve | red Extended Feature Flags Enumeration Leaf (Output depends on ECX size)   |
| 07H                  |                      | Sub leaf 0 (Input ECX = 0).  |
|                      | EAX                  | Bits 31-00: Reports the maximum number of supported leaf 7 sub-<br>leaves.   |
|                      | EBX                  | IER DO FISCIBASE Supports REPSBASE INDUSENSE/WPFSBASE /wRCS<br>BASE # 1.<br>Bit 0.05 Reserved<br>BIT 0.75 MHP. Nupports Supervisor Mode Execution Protection if 1.<br>Bit 0.05 Reserved<br>BIT 0.05 MHP. 1. Supports WINFO Destroy to 1.<br>BIT 1.05 MHP. 1. Supports WINFO Destroy for system software<br>that manages process-context dentifiers.  |
|                      | ECX                  | Reserved   |
|                      | EDX                  | Reserved.  |
|                      | Direct C             | ache Access Information Leaf   |
| 09H                  | EAX                  | Value of bits [31:0] of IA32_PLATFORM_DCA_CAP MSR (address 1F8H)   |
|                      | EBX                  | Reserved   |
|                      | ECX.                 | Reserved   |
|                      | EDX.                 | Reserved   |
|                      | Architec             | tural Performance Monitorino Leaf  |

| Initial EAX<br>Value |         | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|----------------------|---------|--|
| DAH                  | EAX     | Biss D7 - 00: Version ID of architectural performance monitoring<br>Bits 15-08: Number of general-purpose performance monitoring<br>counter per logical processor<br>Biss 23 - 16. Bit width of general-purpose, performance monitoring<br>counter.<br>Biss 31 - 24: Length of EBIX bit vector to enumerate architectural per<br>formance monitoring events.   |
|                      | 68x     | Bit 00 Core cycle event not available if 1<br>Bit 01 instruction retrief event not available if 1<br>Bit 02 Reference cycles event not available if 1<br>Bit 02 Last-level cache reference event not available if 1<br>Bit 04 Last-level cache resistence event not available if 1<br>Bit 05 Branch instruction retrief event not available if 1<br>Bit 05 Branch instruction retrief event not available if 1<br>Bit 31 - 07 Reprived + 0 |
|                      | ECX     | Reserved = 0   |
|                      | EDX     | Bits 04 - 00. Number of fixed-function performance counters (if Ver-<br>sion ID > 1)<br>Bits 12 - 05: Bit width of fixed-function performance counters (if Ver-<br>sion ID > 1)<br>Reserved = 0  |
|                      | Extends | nd Topology Enumeration Leaf   |
| OBH                  |         | NOTES: Most of Leaf OBH output depends on the initial value in ECX. EDIX output do not vary with initial value in ECX. EDIX OI puttout always reflect initial value in ECX. All other output value for on invasit initial value in ECX are O. Leaf OBH exists if ERXIT(SI) in not zero.  |
|                      | EAX     | Bits 04-00: Number of bits to shift right on x2APIC ID to get a unique<br>topology ID of the next level type". All logical processors with the<br>same next level ID share current level.<br>Bits 31-05: Reserved.   |
|                      | 68X     | Bits 15 - 00: Number of logical processors at this level type. The num<br>ber reflects configuration as shipped by Inter*.<br>Bits 31-16: Reserved.  |
|                      | ECX     | Bits 07 - 00: Level number. Same value in ECX input<br>Bits 15 - 08: Level type***,<br>Bits 31 - 16: Reserved  |

| Initial EAX<br>Value | Information Provided about the Processor  EDX Bits 31-00: x2APIC ID the current logical processor. |   |  |  |
|----------------------|--|---|--|--|
|                      |  |   |  |  |
|                      |  | NOTES:  "Software should use this field (EAX[4:0]) to enumerate processor topology of the system.   |  |  |
|                      |  | ** Software must not use EBX[15:0] to enumerate processor topology<br>of the system. This value in this Red (EBX[15:0]) is only intended for<br>display/diagnostic purposes. The actual number of logical processors<br>available to BIDS/DS/Applications may be different from the value of<br>EBX[15:0], depending on software and platform hardware configura-<br>tions. |  |  |
|                      |  | *** The value of the "level type" field is not related to level numbers in<br>any way, higher "level type" values do not mean higher levels. Level<br>type field has the following encoding:<br>0 :invalid<br>1:5917<br>2: Core<br>3:255 : Reserved   |  |  |
|                      | Process  | or Extended State Enumeration Main Leaf (EAX + ODH, ECX + O)  |  |  |
| OOH                  |  | NOTES:<br>Leaf 0DH main leaf (ECX = 0).   |  |  |
|                      | EAX  | Bits 31-00: Reports the valid bit fields of the lower 32 bits of XCRO. If<br>a bit 8 0, the corresponding bit field in XCRO is reserved.<br>Bit 00: egach 73 Bit 01: 128-bit SSE<br>Bit 02: 256-bit AVX<br>Bit 03: 128-bit AVX  |  |  |
|                      | EBIX   | Bits 31-00: Maximum size (bytes, from the beginning of the<br>XSAVE/XRSTOR save area) required by enabled features in XCRO. May<br>be different than ECX if some features at the end of the XSAVE save<br>area are not enabled.   |  |  |
|                      | ECX  | Bit 31-00: Maximum size (bytes, from the beginning of the<br>XSAVEXRSTOR save area) of the XSAVEXRSTOR save area required<br>by all supported features in the processor, i.e. all the valid bit fields in<br>XCRO.  |  |  |
|                      | EDX  | Bit 31-00: Reports the valid bit fields of the upper 32 bits of XCRO. If a bit is 0, the corresponding bit field in XCRO is reserved.   |  |  |

| Initial EAX<br>Value   |                          | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--|
|                        | EAX Bits 31-01: Reserved |  |
|                        | 193500                   | Bit 00: XSAVEOPT is available:   |
|                        | EBX                      | Reserved   |
|                        | ECX                      | Reserved   |
|                        | EDIX                     | Reserved   |
|                        | Process                  | or Extended State Enumeration Sub-leaves (EAX = 00H, ECX = n, n > 1)   |
| 00H                    |                          | NOTES:   |
|                        |                          | Leaf ODH output depends on the initial value in ECX.   |
|                        |                          | If ECX contains an invalid sub-leaf index, EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX return 0<br>Each valid sub-leaf index maps to a valid bit in the XCRD register<br>starting at bit position 2  |
|                        | EAX                      | Bits 31-0: The size in bytes (from the offset specified in EBIX) of the save area for an extended state feature associated with a valid subleaf index, $n$ . This field reports 0 if the sub-leaf index, $n$ , is invalid. |
|                        | EBX                      | Bits 31-0: The offset in bytes of this extended state component's save<br>area from the beginning of the XSAVE/XRSTOR area.<br>This field reports 0 if the sub-leaf index, n, is invalid*.                                 |
|                        | ECX                      | This field reports 0 if the sub-leaf index, n, is invalid; otherwise it is reserved.   |
|                        | EDX                      | This field reports 0 if the sub-leaf index, n, is invalid*; otherwise it is reserved.  |
|                        | Unimple                  | mented CPUID Leaf Functions  |
| 40000000H<br>4FFFFFFFH |                          | Invalid. No existing or future CPU will return processor identification or<br>feature information if the initial EAX value is in the range 40000000H<br>to 4FFFFFFH.   |
|                        | Extende                  | ed Function CPUID Information  |
| 800000000Н             | EAX                      | Maximum input Value for Extended Function CPUID information (see<br>Table 3-18).   |
|                        | EDX<br>EDX               | Reserved<br>Reserved<br>Reserved   |

| Initial EAX<br>Value |                          | Information Provided about the Processor   |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 80000001H            | EAX                      | Extended Processor Signature and Feature Bits.   |
|                      | EBX                      | Reserved   |
|                      | ECX                      | Bit 00: LAHF/SAHF available in 64-bit mode<br>Bits 31-01 Reserved  |
|                      | EDX                      | Biol 10 CDC Reserved Biol 10-17 Edescrived Biol 10-17 Edescrived in General Reserved Biol 20-17 Edescrived Biol 20-1 |
| 80000002н            | EAX<br>EBX<br>ECX<br>EDX | Processor Brand String Processor Brand String Continued Processor Brand String Continued Processor Brand String Continued  |
| 80000003H            | EAX<br>EBX<br>ECX<br>EDX | Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued   |
| 80000004н            | EAX<br>EBX<br>ECX<br>EDX | Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued<br>Processor Brand String Continued   |
| B0000005H            | EAX<br>EBX<br>ECX<br>EDX | Reserved = 0 Reserved = 0 Reserved = 0 Reserved = 0  |
| 80000005н            | EAX                      | Reserved = 0 Reserved = 0  |
|                      | ECX                      | Bits 07-00 Cache Line size in bytes<br>Bits 11-08: Reserved<br>Bits 15-12: L2 Associativity field *<br>Bits 31-16: Cache size in 1K units<br>Bitseaved # 0   |

| Initial EAX<br>Value | Information Provided about the Processor   |         |
|----------------------|--|---------|
|                      | NOTES:  "L2 associativity field encodings:  OH+ Disabled  OH+ Decer mapped  DH+ 2- way  DH+ 2- way  OH+ 4- way  OH+ 1- fie-way  OH+ 1- fie-way  OH+ 1- fie-way  OH+ 1- fie-way |         |
| 80000007Н            | AX Reserved = 0  BX Reserved = 0  CX Reserved = 0  DX Bits 07-00: Reserved = 0  Bits 07-00: Reserved = 0  Bits 08-00: Reserved = 0  Bits 108-00: Reserved = 0                  |         |
| B0000008H            | AX Linear/Physical Address size Bits 07-00: #Physical Address Bits* Bits 15-8: #Linear Address Bits Bits 31-16: Reserved * 0   |         |
|                      | BX   |         |
|                      | NOTES:  If CPUID.80000008H:EAX[7:0] is supported, the maximum pl<br>address number supported should come from this field.  | hysical |



#### Memory forensics

- Idea: let the malware run freely and analyze the memory
- Why is it effective:
  - All interesting is in memory (executable images, file I/O buffers, OS structures and objects etc.)
  - Analysis is done outside the running environment
- Possible drawbacks:
  - Slowness
  - When to dump?
  - On physical machines, dump software can be tampered





- Open-source framework for physical memory analysis
- Support for 32 –and 64-bit Windows, Linux and OSX
- Gather information from processes, virtual memory, OS structures, OS objects and more
- Dump images and memory pages on disk
- Lots of useful plugins, like "malfind"
- Typical workflow: pause a VM, give volatility the physical memory as a flat file

#### **DEMO**



### Volatility example: Equation/GRAYFISH

```
> volatility -f grayfish.vmem malfind
Process: services.exe Pid: 716 Address: 0xb90000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE EXECUTE READWRITE
Flags: CommitCharge: 8, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
0x00b90000 68 00 00 00 00 68 17 00 b9 00 68 d5 1f 82 7c 68
                                                          h...h...h...
0x00b90010 fa 13 b0 00 ff 24 24 8b c5 83 c0 11 c7 00 29 16
                                                          ....$$.....).
0x00b90020 80 7c 81 c0 ad ff ff bf 6a 15 b0 00 33 ed ff
                                                          .|....j...3..
0x00b90030 64 24 fc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
                                                          d$.....
0xb90000 6800000000
                        PUSH DWORD 0x0
                    PUSH DWORD 0xb90017
0xb90005 681700b900
                    PUSH DWORD 0x7c821fd5
0xb9000a 68d51f827c
0xb9000f 68fa13b000 PUSH DWORD 0xb013fa
0xb90014 ff2424 JMP DWORD [ESP]
```

Equation: The Death Star of Malware Galaxy - Kaspersky Labs' Global Research & Analysis Team



#### Equation/GRAYFISH

> volatility -f grayfish.vmem vaddump -pid 716

```
> hexdump -C services.exe.1f64550.0x00b00000-0x00b0afff.dmp
00000000
        0f 5e 30 00 61 00 00 00
                             2c 00 00 00 35 35 00 00
                                                   |.^0.a...,...55...
00000010 e8 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030
        00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                             00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00
                                                    2b e8 cb 44 8f 2b 9c 78
                                                    ..~..#.+..D.+.x
00000050 43 31 60 d0 66 05 ad 66
                             eb 6f 60 81 eb 3a 3a 05
                                                   C1`.f..f.o`..::.
00000060 fc 60 b6 17 60 66 c7 3a
                             60 43 3a 60 ec a5 d1 60
                                                   |.`..`f.:`C:`...`
00000070 6f 05 4c 17 7a 4f 4f ee
                             8c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                   lo.L.z00.....
00000080 99 ac eb 4a 85 97 e5 8f
                             85 97 e5 8f 85 97 e5 8f
                                                    ...J.......
                             80 3e f7 8f 59 97 e5 8f
00000090 a4 73 cb 8f ef 97 e5 8f
                                                    .s........
000000a0 80 3e b9 8f ef 97 e5 8f
                             13 a1 f7 8f 62 97 e5 8f
                                                    .>....b...
                                                    000000b0 a4 ef 06 8f 24 97 e5 8f
                            85 97 1a 8f 7d 97 e5 8f
000000c0 13 a1 2c 8f 97 97 e5 8f
                             b0 37 b9 8f ba 97 e5 8f
                                                    000000d0 06 43 81 78 85 97 e5 8f
                             00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                    .C.x......
000000e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                             00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
000000f0 70 b7 00 00 44 cb 2c 00 e5 16 93 4d 00 00 00 00
                                                   |p...D.,...M....|
```



#### Equation/GRAYFISH

> volatility -f grayfish.vmem vaddump -pid 716

```
> hexdump -C services.exe.1f64550.0x00b00000-0x00b0afff.dmp
                                04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00
00000000
         4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00
00000010
         b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000020
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                  00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                00 00 00 00 f0 00 00 00
         0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd
00000040
                                21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68
                                                        .....!..L.!Th
                                61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f
                                                        is program canno
00000050 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72
                                20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20
                                                        t be run in DOS
00000060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e
00000070 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a
                                                        mode....$.....
                                24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000080 ab 84 61 9e ef e5 0f cd ef e5 0f cd ef e5 0f cd
00000090 6c f9 01 cd ed e5 0f cd 80 fa 05 cd eb e5 0f cd
000000a0 80 fa 0b cd ed e5 0f cd d9 c3 05 cd e6 e5 0f cd
000000b0 6c ed 52 cd ec e5 0f cd ef e5 0e cd d7 e5 0f cd
000000c0 d9 c3 04 cd e5 e5 0f cd
                                10 c5 0b cd ee e5 0f cd
000000d0 52 69 63 68 ef e5 0f cd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000000f0 50 45 00 00 4c 01 04 00 0f 82 59 47 00 00 00 00
                                                        PE..L....YG....
```



### KAN: Forensics memory tracing

- Memory tracing engine KAN:
  - Build on top of KVM, the Linux kernel VM
  - Presented in Recon 2014
- Instead of a single memory snapshot, take a series of snapshots
- Create a coherent overall picture of system behavior (much like debugging/system tracing)
- Capture transient memory data, like
  - Obfuscated code and data
  - Self-modifying code
  - Crypto keys and buffers
  - Short-lived data, like URL's, networking buffers, configuration data, etc.
- More information coming from Endre Bangerter, Security Engineering Lab, Bern University of Applied Sciences



#### Summing it all: Cuckoo sandbox

- Cuckoo has it all: instrumentation with hooks, emulators, memory forensics, network traffic analysis, automated reporting
- Can utilize several different VM platforms: VMWare, KVM,
   VirtualBox, or use a custom platform, for example real HW
- Support of volatility analysis after sample run
- Nice reporting
- Used by VirusTotal and many others





### SWITCH ON FREEDOM